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I. Introduction
Orphan works are the death knell of copyright 
law.  They have been a growing predicament for the 
United States since January 1, 1978 and there has never 
been a successful legislative attempt to fix it.1  That is 
not to say that there has never been a good proposed 
solution to the problem though.  The Shawn Bentley 
Orphan Works Act of 20082 was the closest the United 
States Congress has ever come to solving the problem 
of orphan works.  However, the proposed solution 
would have led to polarizing consequences that affected 
previously disregarded elements of U.S. copyright 
law.  Instead of simply facilitating the eventual use of 
orphan works by those engaging in good faith searches 
to find the owners of orphan works, the Shawn Bentley 
Orphan Works Act would have imposed a system of 
“informal formalities” upon copyright owners while 
functioning in the current “no formalities” system of 
copyright law.  The legislation would have reduced 
the number of orphan works in the United States by 
imposing penalties upon copyright owners, forcing 
those owners to complete specific acts or meet certain 
requirements in order to ensure their copyrights, while 
the remedies for copyright infringement would stay 
intact.  This solution would fall in line with the basic 
foundations of copyright law, but would also force the 
United States to question where its priorities lie.
This paper will first describe what orphan works 
are, why they exist under current copyright law, and 
why they are currently a problem.  Second, the paper 
will review the legislative history regarding attempted 
solutions for the orphan works predicament.  The 
third portion of the paper will describe how the most 
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1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(1976) (informing the public that the Copyright Act of 1976 was 
to become law on January 1, 1978); Shawn Bentley Orphan Works 
Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works Act of 
2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Copyright Modernization 
Act of 2006, H.R. 6052, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2006); Orphan 
Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006).
2.  S. 2913
recent attempt at orphan works legislation, the Shawn 
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, would have 
created a new type of copyright formality called “the 
informal formality,” and how that would have impacted 
copyright owners.  The fourth portion of the paper will 
address possible reactions to the implementation of 
such a law.  The fifth and final section will discuss why 
such legislation is necessary and how a few changes to 
the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 could 
lead to a more acceptable solution to the orphan works 
problem.
II. Why do Orphan Works Exist?
 The term “orphan work” describes a situation 
where an individual wanting to use a work in a way 
that would require prior permission from the copyright 
owner is not able to locate or identify the original 
owner.3  The only two requirements to be an orphan 
work are that a work must be copyrighted, which has 
become significantly more likely since the elimination 
of copyright formalities, and that the owner of such a 
work must be an individual who cannot be located.4  
These two simple requirements, when met, cause 
problems that only federal legislation can fix.5  
Orphan works in the United States are the by-
product of Congress’s war against copyrighted works 
prematurely entering the public domain and the 
international community’s push for stronger creator 
rights.6  Orphan works first appeared on January 1, 
3.  U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.
pdf (traditionally in the form of a license for an exclusive right).
4.  Id. at 1-2.
5.  Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick J. Leahy 
to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 5, 2005), 
reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; Letter from 
Representative Lamar Smith to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of 
Copyrights (January 7, 2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, 
supra note 3; Letter from Representative Howard L. Berman to 
Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 10, 2002), 
reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; U.S. Copyright 
Office, supra note 3, at 15-17; see The Authors Guild v. Google, 
Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The question of 
who should be entrusted with guardianship of orphan books . . . 
safeguards are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than 
through an agreement among private, self-interested parties”).     
6.  Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest 
of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
by Mark Tratos*
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1978, the same day that the Copyright Act of 1976 
became effective.7  The problem became worse in 
1989 when the United States agreed to the terms of 
the Berne Convention.8  These pieces of legislation 
eliminated the long-held requirements (or “formalities”) 
for copyright protection in the U.S.9  
Copyright formalities were conditions or acts 
independent from simply creating the work required of 
a work’s creator to ensure that the work was protected 
by copyright.10   If someone wanted to ensure a 
monopoly on the use of his work and retain the ability 
to license the exclusive rights associated with that work, 
he would stringently adhere to the formalities or risk 
his work entering the public domain forever.11  This 
required a number of actions, such as publishing the 
work, placing notice of copyright protection upon 
the work, depositing the work with the Library of 
Congress, renewing the term of copyright protection, 
and recording the transfer of exclusive rights.12  One 
formality almost singlehandedly caused the orphan 
works problem however.      
While U.S. copyright law does not require the 
registration of an author’s work to gain copyright 
protection, it is required if an owner wishes to enforce 
their rights in the United States.13  In addition, for 
a rights-holder to recover attorney’s fees or statutory 
damages, she must register the work before the 
infringement occurs.14  This formality incentivized 
the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Com. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1-2 (2008) (Statement of Howard M. 
Berman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property, of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary); see U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 3. 
7.  See Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick 
J. Leahy to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 
5. 2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3 (“A 
principal concern is that the current Copyright Act might be 
creating a class of ‘orphan works’ – works for which no copyright 
owner can be found, and this which permission to use or to adapt 
these works cannot be obtained.”).
8.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, art. 5(2), as revised  on July 24. 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 30, 35 available at  http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201161/volume-1161-I-18338-English.pdf 
(eliminating all formalities which could prevent a creator form 
obtaining a copyright).  
9.  Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest 
of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Com. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong.  20 (2008) (Statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Register of Copyright); see U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 3.
10.  See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 60.
11.  Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory 
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 Colum. J.L. & 
Arts 311, 321-22 (2009).
12.  Id. at 315-18.
13.  The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2008).
14.  Id. § 412.
copyright owners to register their works promptly, 
even though it was not required to receive a copyright 
after 1909.15  Registration would in turn encourage 
individuals wishing to use the work to search the 
registry of copyrighted works at the Copyright 
Office, which serves as the pre-eminent database of 
copyrighted works.16  This concept relies on the idea 
that a search of the U.S. Copyright registry can yield 
fruitful results.17  Registration of a work also benefits 
the owner by serving as a prima facie presumption 
of copyright validity if the author registers the work 
within five years of its publication.18
The formalities that were pervasive throughout the 
U.S. system of copyrights eventually found themselves 
extinct after Congress eliminated formalities in four 
distinct ways.  First, the Copyright Act of 1976 
granted copyright protection upon the fixation of the 
work, a change from the previous requirement that 
an author publish her work with notice or register an 
unpublished work before it could receive protection.19  
Creators now simply produce their work in order 
to receive copyright protection.20  Second, the 1976 
Act21and later the Copyright Term Extension Act,22 
extended the term of copyright ownership to the life 
of the author plus an additional seventy years.23  The 
term of copyright protection has potentially tripled 
and the creator is not required to take any additional 
steps.  Third, the alteration and extension of the term 
of copyright eliminated the renewal requirement found 
in the Copyright Act of 1909.24  Fourth, the Berne 
15.  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 2, 10 
(1909) (holding that publication of a work with notice would 
suffice requirements for copyright protection).  
16.  Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Proof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 
700-01 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the awarding of damages that 
are contingent on registration promotes the early registration of 
copyrights).
17.  But cf. John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright: 
Registration, Cultural Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright 
Militancy, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1399, 1430-31 (2009) 
(acknowledging that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office 
will be non-interpretive and search criteria may not accurately 
identify the work or owner sought out).
18.  17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2008). 
19.  17 U.S.C. § 102(2008); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 
No. 60-349, §§ 2, 10 (1909).
20.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (noting that something will receive 
copyright protection if it is an original work fixed in a tangible 
medium).
21.  See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a) (1976) (extending the 
term of copyright ownership from 56 years to the life of the author 
plus 50 years).  
22.  See Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), (d) (2008) (extending 
copyright protection an additional 20 years).
23.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
24.  See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3 at 3; Copyright 
Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349 § 24.
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Convention, agreed to by the United States in 1989, 
eliminated the formal requirements that creators had to 
meet both to receive copyright protection and exercise 
their exclusive rights associated with copyright, which 
included the visual notice requirements upon a work.25  
By the new millennium, copyright law protected works 
in the United States upon fixation, for longer periods, 
with a much smaller chance for the work entering the 
public domain, and without requiring identification 
that the work was actually protected.  These four factors 
suddenly made it much harder to discern whether a 
work was protected by a copyright.   
The abolition of formalities was only one factor 
in the rise of orphan works.  Despite the fact that 
individuals now had to assume any work they 
encountered was protected,26 copyright owners of those 
works could still be identified, meaning the work is 
not an orphan work.27  The methods an individual 
can use to identify the owner of a copyrighted work, 
whether in the U.S. or abroad, have never yielded 
sufficient or wholly accurate results.28  The U.S. 
Copyright Office Registry, the singular government-
approved database available to individuals wanting 
to determine who controls the rights to a work, does 
not provide an effective way to identify the owner of 
a specific copyrighted work.29  Since a registry search 
may not provide the necessary information sought to 
identify a copyright owner, an individual must find 
the information in other ways, assuming the copyright 
owner registered the work in the first place.30
25.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, art. 5(2), as revised  on July 24. 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 30, 35 available at  http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201161/volume-1161-I-18338-English.pdf 
(noting that the requirement for some form of notice upon any 
copyrighted work was a formality which would not comply with the 
treaty).  
26.  See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 15-16 (noting 
that automatic copyright protection could exist in cases where 
circumstances lead people to believe the work has no commercial 
value).
27.  See id. at 1 (recognizing one of the requirements of an 
orphan work is that the creator or rights-holder cannot be found). 
28.  See also id. at 32-34 (determining that factors like the 
cost of a search, the lack of identifying information on a work, the 
general obscurity of the work, and the country of the works origin 
will hamper a potential licensor’s search or decision to conduct a 
search).
29.  See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430-31 (acknowledging 
that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office will be non-
interpretive and search criteria may not accurately identify the work 
or owner sought out).
30.  When conducting an electronic search of the Copyright 
Office’s public catalogue, search entries will often provide you with 
a title of the work, the type of work, the year of the work’s creation, 
and the date of the work’s publication.  The search will not provide 
you with any contact information in order to make contact with the 
author.  The search entry will also no provide you with an example 
Although the lack of effective search methods and 
the current insufficiencies of the Copyright Office’s 
Registry have made it hard to identify the owners 
of copyrights, current technology and the culture 
surrounding digital works have made the process 
of identifying rights-holders even more difficult.  
Recent technological developments have facilitated 
the availability of works in digital formats and the 
ability to copy those works multiple times over.31  Our 
current technology-heavy, instant gratification culture 
encourages the distribution of copies to one or two 
friends, who in turn disperse their copies in similar 
ways.32  These copies often contain no information 
that a searcher could use to identify the author or 
rights-holder of the work.33  This is partially because of 
digital piracy and partially because of the elimination 
of the notice formality from U.S. copyright law.34  The 
problem is particularly pervasive in digital copies of 
photographs.35  Current technologies allow users to 
encounter works in a multitude of ways that often 
afford no opportunity to identify the author or rights-
holder of the work.  With no indication of the identity 
of the copyright owner, potential licensors are forced 
to use the U.S. Copyright Registry and their own 
intuition to find the owner, both of which often prove 
to be unsuccessful.36  This is how orphan works came 
to be.  
III. Why are Orphan Works a Problem?
Both Congress and the Copyright Office believe 
that the orphan works problem has had a dramatic 
impact on the economy.37  The copyright system in 
the United States has created a market around the 
of the work to ensure the work or author searched for is the work or 
author found.   
31.  See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Finding New Paths 
Through the Internet: Content and Copyright, 12 Tul. J. Tech. 
& Intell. Prop. 145, 146-47 (2009) (recognizing that the 
Internet facilitates transactions outside the visible market, making 
transactions hard to monitor and control).
32.  See id. at 147.
33.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 23.
34.  Id. at 26, 41-42.
35.  Id. at 24.
36.  See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430-31 (acknowledging 
that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office will be non-
interpretive and search criteria may not accurately identify the work 
or owner sought out).
37.  See Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick 
J. Leahy to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 5, 
2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; Letter 
from Representative Lamar Smith to Marybeth Peters, Registrar of 
Copyrights (January 7, 2005), reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, 
supra note 3; Letter from Representative Howard L. Berman to 
Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights (January 10, 2002), 
reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3; U.S. Copyright 
Office, supra note 3, at 15-17.
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control of exclusive rights to a copyrighted work.38 If 
an individual wants to exercise the rights to a particular 
work she does not own, she seeks out the owner of that 
work and negotiates a contract or license to use the 
work.39  Owners and potential licensors determine the 
value of the rights to that particular work, thus shaping 
the market and pushing the economy forward.40  This 
system of negotiations and eventual transactions 
necessitates, however, that an individual can find the 
author or rights-holder of a work.41  When searchers 
cannot find the rights-holders, the copyright market 
suffers.42  
The fact that a work is an orphan does not mean 
that people do not still want to acquire the rights to 
its use.  In fact, the growth of digital works and the 
Internet has increased the demand for the acquisition of 
rights from a variety of sources.43  When individuals are 
unable to discover or locate the author or rights-holder 
of a work they wish to exploit, a potential licensor is 
forced to make a serious decision: does she use the 
work without permission and risk an infringement 
lawsuit,44 or, does a she simply abandon her desire to 
use the work, choosing not to risk liability?45  Potential 
licensors often choose not to use the work.46  This 
fear of lawsuits has been incredibly debilitating to 
the market for copyright licenses and to the nation’s 
heritage.47  
The inability to use orphan works without the fear 
of infringement suits has affected the entire market of 
38.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 15. 
39.  Id.
40.  Id.
41.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 1.
42.  See also Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the 
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong.  19-20 (2008) (statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Register of Copyright) (asserting that if there is no copyright 
owner, there is no beneficiary of the copyright terms and that is an 
enormous waste in the copyright market).
43.  C.f. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 153-54 (asserting that 
the internet is now seen as a place for new artists to be discovered, 
in addition to being a place where a large amount of piracy of 
unattributed works occurs).
44.  See 154 Cong. Rec. S3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); see also 154 Cong. Rec. S3405-
06 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
45.  Id. 
46.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 15.
47.  See Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the 
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, supra note 42 (asserting that when a copyright owner 
cannot be identified and potential users abandon the work, several 
productive projects which may be beneficial to our national heritage 
are lost); id.
potential copyright licensors.48  The Report on Orphan 
Works from the U.S. Copyright Office identified 
four general types of users who most often wanted to 
make use of orphan works, ranging from individuals 
wanting to incorporate orphan works into their own 
large-scale creations to individuals who are “small-time” 
enthusiasts or who wish to obtain the work for private 
uses.49  All of these potential users have the ability to 
bring new life or new audiences to works, but many 
decide against using the work when they consider the 
potential liability standing in their way.50  Potential 
users of orphan works were unable to conduct business 
in the market of copyright licenses and therefore 
Congress proposed orphan-work legislation.51
IV. Orphan Works Legislation
There have been a few recent attempts to pass 
legislation to correct the orphan works problem.  
Orphan works legislation was first proposed in the 
United States House of Representatives in 200652, but 
the Orphan Works Act of 2006 never made it out of 
the House Judiciary Committee53.  After it was clear 
the legislation would never receive enough votes on the 
floor of the House, supporters subsequently inserted 
the substance of the 2006 Act into the Copyright 
Modernization Act of 200654, which was stuck in 
committee.55  Attempts at an orphan works solution 
did not die though, as legislation reemerged in 2008 
through two different bills.56  The Orphan Works Act 
of 2008 appeared and subsequently died in the House 
of Representatives,57 and the Shawn Bentley Orphan 
Works Act of 2008 (S. 2913), which originated in 
48.  See Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the 
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, supra note 42 (asserting that when a copyright owner 
cannot be identified and potential users abandon the work, several 
productive projects which may be beneficial to our national heritage 
are lost)
49.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 36-40 (asserting 
that the categories of proposed uses are “uses by subsequent 
creators,” “large-scale access uses,” “enthusiast uses,” and “private 
uses”).
50.  See 154 Cong. Rec. S3405-06 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) 
(statement of Patrick J. Leahy) (“[O]rphan works . . . often languish 
unseen, because those who would like to bring them to light, and 
to the attention of the world, fear the prospect of prohibitively 
expensive statutory damages.”).
51.  See S. 2913; H.R. 5889; H.R. 6052; H.R. 5439.
52.  H.R. 5439.
53.  See Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33392, Orphan Works 
in Copyright Law 8 (2010).  
54.  H.R. 6052 (appearing in Title 2).
55. See Brian T. Yeh, supra note 53.
56.  Alessandra Glorioso, Note, Google Books: An Orphan 
Works Solution?, 38 Hofstra L. Rev. 971, 980 (2010).
57.  Id.; H.R. 5889. 
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the Senate and was passed by the higher house, was 
eventually lost in House committee.58  The Shawn 
Bentley Orphan Works Act is the focus of this paper 
not only because the bill represented the culmination 
of changes deemed necessary after considering the 
previous legislative attempts,59 but also because of the 
likelihood that a bill resembling the Shawn Bentley 
Orphan Works Act of 2008 could be passed by the 
United States Senate again, and possibly the House of 
Representatives in future.  
Congress introduced the Shawn Bentley Act of 
2008 (S.2913) to solve the problem of orphan works.  
S.2913’s primary goal, as agreed on by the bill’s 
sponsors, was to identify the owners of such works.60  
By encouraging the identification of the authors or 
rights-holders of the orphan works, the Act would 
facilitate the licensing of these works to interested 
parties.61  The Act was designed to keep the most 
basic tenets of U.S. copyright law intact, ensuring 
that a rights-holder may still benefit from their work 
as they did previously.62  With these two aims in 
mind, legislators attempted to re-insert thousands of 
previously unidentifiable and unusable works back into 
the licensing market.63  The way in which the Shawn 
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 intended to do 
58.  S. 2913; see Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing 
the Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual property of H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 42.
59.  See also Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the 
Interest of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
On the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual property of H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, supra note 42, at 24-25 (statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Register of Copyrights) (incorporating changes designed to 
protect visual artists, to document searches, to define “reasonable 
compensation,” and to address the availability of attorney’s fees).
60.  See also U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 93 (“Any 
system to deal with orphan works should seek primarily to make 
it more likely that a user can find the relevant owner in the first 
instance”); 154 Cong. Rec. S3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); 154 Cong. Rec. S3405-06 
(daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
61.   See 154 Cong. Rec. S3405-06 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) (believing that the identification 
of rights-holders will help the owners receive compensation).
62.  See id. (noting that the act was not designed to change 
the basic premise of copyright law, that if you use the copyrighted 
works of others, you must compensate them for such  use); see 
also Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest of 
Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. On the 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual property of H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, supra note 42, at 21 (statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights) (“we do not wish to unduly prejudice the 
legitimate rights of the copyright owner by depriving him of the 
ability to assert infringement or hinder his ability to collect an 
award that reflects the true value of his work”).  
63.  154 Cong. Rec. S3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
this, however, would prove to be truly controversial, 
challenging the very tenets upon which U.S. and 
international copyrights currently rely.  
The drafters wrote the Shawn Bentley Orphan 
Works Act of 2008 from the perspective of a rights-
holder of an orphan work, with Section 2 of the Act 
dealing the most damage to said rights-holders.  The 
section informed the rights-holder that there was a 
limitation placed upon the remedies available to them 
if someone infringed their work, should the Act deem it 
an orphan.64  Section 2 proposed that remedies would 
be limited if the alleged infringer “performed and 
documented a qualifying search, in good faith, to locate 
and identify the owner of the infringed copyright; 
and was unable to locate and identify the owner of 
the infringed copyright.”65  After a more meticulous 
description of what a qualifying search would entail, 
the Act described the limitations upon remedies, 
allowing the rights-holder to receive only “reasonable 
compensation” from the guilty infringer.66  Rights-
holders received a small allowance of injunctive relief, 
dependent on whether the infringer paid “reasonable 
compensation” to the owner of the orphan work upon 
identification of the owner or if infringement litigation 
occurred.67  Therefore, while the Act proposed a way 
for potential licensors to identify the owners of orphan 
works68, it also notified those same owners that the Act 
limited their enforcement rights and ability to recoup 
damages, should they remain unidentified when an 
individual used their work.  
Because of this shift, the Act required potential 
infringers to perform a search for the rights-holders in 
order to escape the liability for using an orphan work.69  
To conduct a “qualifying search” for the owner of the 
work, the individual would undertake a “diligent effort 
that is reasonable under the circumstances to locate 
the owner of the infringed copyright prior to, and at 
the time reasonably proximate to, the infringement.”70  
The diligent effort to find the rights-holders required 
a minimum of 5 steps to be taken:  (1) a search of all 
Copyright Office records available to the public; (2) a 
search of all reasonably available sources of copyright 
owner and licensor information; (3) the use of all 
appropriate technologies, publications, and experts to 
locate the owner; (4) the use of appropriate internet 
databases to locate the owner; (5) and performance of 
64.  S. 2913 § 2.
65.  Id. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(II).
66.  Id. § 2(c)(1)(A).
67.  Id. § 2(c)(2)(A).
68.  154 Cong. Rec. S3,437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
69.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(i)
70.  Id.
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any other actions when searching that could be deemed 
“reasonable and appropriate” when considering the 
facts that have been discovered during the course of the 
investigation.71  The Copyright Office shaped the search 
through a statement of recommended practices,72 which 
attempted to hone the search for the rights-holder, as 
legislators rationalized that different search parameters 
would prove effective for different types of works.73  
The limitations on remedies in the Shawn Bentley 
Orphan Works Act of 2008 applied to both monetary 
relief and injunctive relief.  The monetary damages 
previously available to a registered work include actual 
damages, statutory damages, costs and attorney’s 
fees.74  These damages would no longer be available to 
the rights-holder if the infringer met the “qualifying 
search” requirements.75  Instead, the rights-holder 
only recovered “reasonable compensation,” which was 
intended by the Copyright Office and legislators to 
be the market value of the copyright license if they 
had engaged in negotiations of a license before the 
infringement began.76  Even then, the Act placed the 
burden upon the copyright owner, not the infringer, to 
prove that the work in question was worth market value 
at the time of infringement.77  If a copyright owner 
wished to pursue injunctive relief upon the infringer of 
her copyright, the Act required stringent limitations.  
Infringers who successfully met the “qualifying search” 
requirement of subsection (b) recovered monetary 
damages for the injury that the injunction would 
cause.78  In addition the Act provided that, should an 
infringer meet the requirements of subsection (b) and 
pay reasonable compensation to the copyright owner 
in a timely manner, the copyright owner would not 
have the right to pursue injunctive relief of any kind.79  
Through the limitation of monetary and injunctive 
71.  Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii).
72.  Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(iii).
73.  Id.; see also U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 109-
10.
74.  17 U.S.C. §§ 504-05 (2006).
75.  S. 2913 § 2(c)(1)(A).
76.  Id.§ 2(c)(1)(B) (holding that reasonable compensation 
must not be paid if the infringer is a “nonprofit educational 
institution, museum, library, archives, or public broadcasting entity” 
or if the infringer proves the infringement was not done to receive a 
commercial advantage, the infringement was educational in nature, 
or if the infringers stopped infringement upon receiving a notice of 
claim of infringement); U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 116.
77.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 116-17 (noting 
that reasonable compensation, in many cases, may be found to 
be zero or royalty-free because similar transactions in the market 
support such a finding).
78.  S. 2913 § 2(c)(2)(A) (holding that the harm to the 
infringer must be noted by the court before any injunctive relief can 
be granted).
79.  Id. § 2(c)(2)(B)-(C).
relief for the copyright owner, the Shawn Bentley 
Orphan Works Act would have created, in essence, 
a compulsory license for the exclusive rights of any 
orphan work.  As a result of the Act, either the infringer 
would have found the owner of the orphan work 
through a qualifying search and hopefully negotiated 
a reasonable license, or the infringer would have been 
unable to find the owner and would have used the work 
anyway.  If someone used the work without finding 
the owner he or she might eventually pay the same 
reasonable cost of a license, but only if the owner of the 
orphan work later identified themselves or sued.  The 
only possible options that a copyright owner would 
have had to prevent his or her work from being used 
would be to deny the grant of a license when asked by 
potential users or make sure they could be found by 
potential users conducting a diligent, qualifying search.  
In either case, an individual must be able to identify 
and locate the owner of the copyright.  The desire to 
find the owners of orphan works started to look more 
like legislators’ desire to use orphan works with or 
without the owner’s permission.80
Members of Congress threw the gauntlet.  They 
legislated a procedure for the potential infringer to 
follow with the eventual destination being a copyright 
license.  Individuals would know exactly what stops 
they must take along the route: searching the records 
of the copyright office, using experts, scouring internet 
databases, and so on.  In fact, the odds were better to 
get a license if you performed a reasonable search and 
did not find the rights-holder because at worst, you 
would end up paying reasonable compensation for the 
license, and that was only if the owner of the orphan 
work appeared.  So when Congress tried to force 
authors and rights-holders to grant unwanted licenses, 
Congress said those same authors and rights-holders 
must do all they can to make sure their works do not 
become orphans.  To do that, creators and rights-
holders must purposefully place themselves and their 
works in the public, assuring themselves that anyone 
who would wish to license their work would find them, 
and thus retaining the ability to bring the weight of the 
United States Judicial System upon infringers.
V.  The Creation of the Informal Formality
As legislators and the U.S. Copyright Office 
observed the problems that orphan works were 
causing in the copyright market, they were left with a 
80.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 8 (asserting that 
the first goal of orphan works legislation was to create a system that 
would make it more likely for users to find a relevant rights-holder 
and negotiated a license agreement and recognizing that the second 
goal was to encourage use of orphan works only when the rights-
holder could not be found).
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predicament.  Were they to re-impose the formalities 
that originally prevented the existence of orphan works, 
or were they to kneel before the orphan works problem 
and accept the mess as the new standard?  The Shawn 
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 was an attempt to 
navigate between the two extremes.  Legislators alleged 
it was not attempting to create formalities for copyright 
owners to meet; however, they evidently thought that 
they must put some requirements in place to prevent 
orphan works from overrunning the market.81  The 
concept of informal formality emerged.  
An informal formality, as this author defines it, is 
an action taken by the owner of a copyright to ensure 
he do not lose any rights associated with that copyright. 
Unlike formalities however, copyright law does not 
specifically require or even articulate these actions.  An 
owner will not necessarily lose his rights if he does not 
complete the formalistic task.  Instead, a copyright 
owner can choose to take this extra step to ensure that 
there will never be a circumstance in which he will not 
lose his rights.  
Before the creation of the informal formality 
however, both the legislators and the U.S. Copyright 
Office knew they could not transgress the international 
treaty limits.82  The Berne Convention, as well as 
other international agreements83, has prevented the 
imposition of formalities upon foreign authors.84  
Specifically, the Convention prevents the imposition of 
any requirement, other than the creation of the work 
itself, to ensure an author retains a copyright.85  Most of 
the countries that agreed to the Berne Convention no 
longer require creators to comply with any copyright 
formality.86  However, the Berne Convention does not 
suspend all formalities.87  There is a notable difference 
81.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 61 (“Any 
legislative solution to the orphan works problem, must not require 
an author to comply with formalities if failure to comply with those 
formalities would result in the author becoming unable to enjoy or 
exercise copyright in the work.”).
82.  Id.
83.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15. 1994, art. 9.1 Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal 
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, 
87 (1994); World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty art. 3, Dec 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 69 (1997); World 
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty art. 20, Dec. 20, 1996 36 I.L.M. 76, 86 (1997). 
84.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, art. 5(2), as revised  on July 24. 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 30, 35 available at  http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201161/volume-1161-I-18338-English.pdf 
(noting that the Berne Convention does not apply to a country’s 
imposition of copyright formalities upon its own creators).
85.  Id.
86.  See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 313.
87.  Id. at 314
between formalities that affect ownership of a copyright 
or rights therein and formalities affecting whether a 
copyright exists or whether a rights-holder can enforce 
his rights.88  Those differences are the reason that 
sections 411 and 412 of the Copyright Act of 1976 still 
exist.  U.S. Copyright law does not force individuals to 
register their work with the Copyright Office in order 
to receive a copyright.89  Instead, registration gives 
copyright owners the power to enforce their copyright 
and to receive different types of monetary damages 
through infringement litigation.90  There has been 
speculation as to the legality of the relief limitations 
imposed by U.S. copyright law in the face of the 
Berne Convention.91  Berne states that any copyright 
registration system that affects or alters substantive, 
exclusive rights granted through copyright too closely 
resembles a formality.92  If a copyright owner cannot 
pursue statutory damages or attorney’s fees in an 
infringement action, little would be done to encourage 
copyright enforcement amongst rights-holders.93  
Despite such a reading, the United States has continued 
to require registration of a work to commence 
infringement litigation.  It is amongst this quagmire of 
international conventions and statutory law that the 
Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 attempted 
to make its mark.
Despite the fact that the goal of orphan works 
legislation was to identify the owners of orphan works, 
the legislation was a roadmap for potential infringers, 
charting a course on how to search for the owners of 
orphan works, with the destination being the use of 
the orphan work in almost every situation.  In order 
to prevent such uncontrolled use of orphan works, 
copyright owners would have to make sure that they are 
along the side of the road, waving down each potential 
infringer, notifying them of who the rights-holder was.  
This begins with the diligent effort requirement of the 
“quality search.”94  
The first requirement of the diligent effort was an 
internet search of the publically available records of 
the Copyright Office, assuming that the work provides 
enough identifying information on which a potential 
licensor can base a search.95  The registration of a work 
88.  Id.
89.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2011).
90.  Id. §§ 411-12.
91.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, art. 5, Sept. 9, 1886, (amended on Sept. 28, 1979), 
S. Treaty, Doc. No. 99-27 (1986)  (“The enjoyment and the exercise 
of these rights shall not be subject to any formality”).
92.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 61; Tehranian, 
supra note 17, at 1439 (including significant remedies).
93.  Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1439.
94.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii).
95.  Id. § (b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(aa).
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with the Copyright Office would be a potentially 
necessary step if copyright owners wished to be found 
by potential licensors.  The lack of comprehensive 
results that often occurs after a search of the Copyright 
Registry, however, made this step unlikely to be 
fruitful.96  The creator of a work would not only have 
to register their work, but also provide a title, name, or 
keyword that  sufficiently described the work in hopes 
that a potential licensor would consider the same title, 
name, or keyword when they search for the work.  If 
both the owner and the potential licensor consider the 
same terms, the likelihood of a successful search of 
the Copyright Office’s public catalog becomes more 
reasonable.  While such searches often prove to be 
fruitless, registering with the Copyright Office would 
increase the likelihood that a potential licensor would 
find the creator of a work.  Taking such an opportunity 
would result in either a potential licensor finding the 
owner or a court finding that a diligent effort was not 
made by the infringer to try to locate the owner, thus 
securing a plethora of monetary and injunctive relief 
for the rights-holder.  
The second diligent effort requirement was a 
search of sources of copyright ownership, authorship 
information, and if possible, licensor information.97  
While this search was limited to sources reasonably 
available to the potential licensor, the criterion 
did encapsulate a plethora of potential sources of 
information.  This search requirement included the 
Copyright Card Catalog at the Library of Congress.98  
In addition, the vagueness of the definition of “source 
of copyright authorship and information” could 
have allowed the courts to impose numerous other 
potential searches of information sources upon a 
licensor, dependent upon the facts of the case.  The 
Copyright Office even predicted that orphan works 
legislation would develop privately owned and operated 
sources of copyright authorship information.99  If 
such sources appeared, one source, if not more, could 
become de facto components of a diligent search for 
potential licensors.100   The growth of private sources of 
copyright information and the possible creation of de 
facto components would lead to creators and copyright 
owners finding included indentifying information 
within those sources.  By encouraging a rights-holder 
96.  See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430-31 (acknowledging 
that search reports from the U.S. Copyright office will be non-
interpretive and search criteria may not accurately identify the work 
or owner sought out).
97.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(bb)
98.  Circular 23: The Copyright Card Catalog and the Online 
Files of the Copyright Office 1 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ23.pdf
99.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 103-04.
100.  Id.
to associate their works with these sources, simply in 
hopes that the rights-holders would be more easily 
found, we can assume the rate of publication of works 
will rise.  While publication of a work has not been a 
requirement of copyright protection in many years101, 
it suddenly may be a way of ensuring that potential 
licensors find the creators.  
The third diligent effort requirement was the use of 
appropriate technological tools, printed publications, 
and expert assistance when conducting a search for 
a copyright owner.102  This requirement opened the 
reasonable search criteria for a potential licensor beyond 
that of the Copyright Office’s resources.  Resources like 
internet search engines, address directories, telephone 
directories, and even ownership information appearing 
on the orphan works themselves were potential areas 
requiring reasonable search before limitations could 
be placed on the liability of a copyright infringer.103  
The growth of high-speed internet, e-mail, and search 
engines has potentially made it much easier for a 
rights-holder to be found.104  If a potential licensor 
was required to use the internet to search for the 
owner of an orphan work, there would be impetus for 
a work owner to then put their work online.  Online 
publication is not required by any statute or regulation, 
but it would increase the likelihood of finding that the 
owner of any copyrighted work.  This requirement is 
not limited to online publications.  The requirement to 
search printed publications could lead to the growth of 
copyrighted works directories, potentially functioning 
like the Copyright Office Card Catalogue.  While 
the existence of such publications would not require 
rights-holders to place themselves and their works in 
the publication, such opportunities could have given 
creators the best chance of retaining all of their rights 
to monetary and injunctive relief.  Should individuals 
become experts in locating the rights-holders of orphan 
works, would it not also be prudent for the creators 
of orphan works to make themselves known to such 
experts?  Owners should at least associate themselves 
with or publish themselves within the resources used by 
those experts so that licensors can identify them.         
The fourth diligent effort requirement was the most 
controversial.  This criterion told potential licensors to 
make “use of appropriate databases, including databases 
that are available to the public through the Internet.”105  
101.  Publication has not been a requirement for copyright 
protection since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 on 
January 1, 1978.  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 
Stat. 2541 (1976)
102.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(cc).
103.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 77-78.
104.  Id. at 104.
105.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(dd).
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This requirement acknowledged the potential faults of 
the Copyright Office Registry, in that a search of the 
registry may not provide sufficient results.106  Instead, 
the federal legislators preferred to release a potential 
tidal wave of databases upon rights-holders and 
licensors.107  The Copyright Office even acknowledged 
that the operation of a singular registration system or 
database would be cost ineffective.108  The existence 
of a singular copyright database or registry could also 
lead to disagreements between system administrators 
and rights-holders choosing to enter their work in the 
database, as rights-holders may believe that the database 
is unable to provide the sufficient resources to chronicle 
and document the work.109  Instead, the Copyright 
Office suggested that multiple registries would solve 
the orphan works problem, and the fourth requirement 
encapsulated all those databases in the reasonable 
search.110  These would most likely have been private 
registries, as the private market has better capabilities 
to market their products to potential rights-holders and 
desired licensors.111  While the Copyright Office and 
legislators desired to distance themselves as much as 
possible from mandatory registration requirements,112 
they still required the search of registries by those 
looking to obtain licenses to exclusive rights.113  If 
copyright owners wished to protect their ability to 
receive full monetary and injunctive relief, they must 
ensure that potential licensors found them.  Placing 
their works in the databases described was a way to, 
yet again, increase the likelihood of potential licensors 
finding copyright owners.  Take note that a potential 
licensor would mostly likely not meet the diligent 
effort requirement by simply searching one database, 
but many.114  This leads one to believe that a creator 
would have to register their work in multiple databases 
to facilitate their discovery.  The legislation encouraged 
copyright owners to comply with more increasingly 
burdensome steps to ensure that they are identified and 
106.  See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1430.
107.  See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 104-05.
108.  Id. (relying on their experience operating a registration 
database for copyrights, they understand a singular system entails 
larger costs and burdens than most individuals fail to anticipate).
109.  Id. (noting that the ambiguous scope of registrations, 
paired with constant evolution in copyrighted works, may not 
insure that information in the registry is an effective way of 
indentifying or cataloguing the work).
110.  Id. at 106 (“[W]e believe that registries are critically 
important, if not indispensible, to addressing the orphan works 
problem.”).
111.  Id. 
112.  See id. at 105 (acknowledging the traps caused by 
mandatory registration systems). 
113.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(dd).
114.  See id.(requiring that a reasonable search be conducted 
does not limit the search to one database).
located along with their work.
The fifth and final explicit requirement of a diligent 
search was the performance of actions deemed to be 
“reasonable and appropriate” under the circumstances 
of the search.115  This last criterion was the one piece 
of hope for a rights-holder.  If a potential licensor, 
during the completion of any of the four minimum 
requirements for a diligent search, located any 
information about who may own the rights to a work 
that information could force the licensor to continue 
his search until the investigation has come to a fruitful 
end.116  Once the five requirements of the diligent 
search were met, however, that did not mean that the 
potential licensor, or the owner, was free to do as they 
please.
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 
also created “recommended practices” for potential 
licensors.  The recommended practices were intended 
to be the ongoing contribution of the United States 
Copyright Office to fix the orphan works problem.117  
The Copyright Office noted that potential users 
desired guidelines to follow when searching for works 
and owners in different mediums.118  Recommended 
practices would allow the Copyright Office to address 
the requirements of the diligent search with more 
specificity, guiding licensors to focus on particular 
criteria of the diligent search for different types of 
works.  The Copyright Office, with this requirement, 
could determine a de facto database to be explored or 
tool to be used in order to meet the diligent search 
requirement of S. 2913.  The Copyright Office has 
investigated potential technologies and databases that 
could have made their way into the “recommended 
practices,”119 further spelling out criteria for a diligent 
search and hinting at locations where copyright owners 
should make themselves and their works known to 
prevent their works from becoming orphans.  With this 
power granted to the Copyright Office, the five criteria 
115.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
116.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 106 (holding 
that a reasonable search would entail efforts to identify, locate and 
make contact with any individuals associated with the work who are 
probably not the legal owners of any right).
117.  See 154 Cong. Rec. S-3437-38 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (noting that the disclosure of 
“best practices” for finding the owner of an orphan work will be the 
contribution of the Copyright office, which the courts will make 
determinations as to if searches are diligent and in good faith).
118.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 108.
119.  Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest 
of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of H. Com. on 
the Judiciary, supra note 42 (informing the committee of recent 
examination of products and databases from Copyright Clearance 
Center, Digimarc, Google, InfoFlows, PicScout, PLUS, Audible 
Magic and Corbis).
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of the diligent search were suddenly less reliable because 
the Copyright Office had the power to expand or 
define the reasonable search criteria at will.  Following 
the roadmap in the statute would no longer be enough.
Lastly, the Act imposed a payment requirement.  
The legislation informed the potential licensor that 
qualifying searches might require the use of databases 
or other technical resources that necessitate a payment 
or subscription to use.120  While this element was 
clearly directed at the potential user, there was nothing 
to indicate that the databases could not charge the 
individuals populating the database as well.  Some 
rights-holders would no doubt be comfortable with 
paying to ensure their exclusive rights stay intact, but 
others would most likely stay away from using a costly 
service.  Would database owners find more revenue 
charging the potential licensors who want to find the 
rights-holders, or charging the rights-holders who just 
want to be found?  It is not clear how this would have 
worked out, especially in the private sector, but when 
placed in the hands of unregulated sectors, the potential 
ramifications should be noted.
While the intentions of the Shawn Bentley Orphan 
Works of 2008 were grand, were they worth the risks 
and potential harm placed upon rights-holders?  The 
informal formalities were a dramatic development and 
the limitations on relief were possibly huge, but on a 
grander scale, what could have been the ramifications 
on copyright law?
VI. Ramifications on Current Copyright Law
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 
aimed to address the inadequacies of the U.S. copyright 
system, and while it did that, it challenged some long-
standing tenets of copyright law.  From statute to 
case law to international treaty, everything was on the 
cutting block to cure orphan works.
The Act would have substantially affected 
monetary relief.  As the Act made clear, the only 
possible monetary relief available to a rights-holder was 
“reasonable compensation” in the form of the market 
price for the license prior to the infringement.121  In 
current copyright infringement cases, reasonable 
compensation to a copyright owner would be the 
“actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the 
infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are 
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into 
account in computing the actual damages.”122  Prior 
to S. 2913, when an infringer used an orphan work, 
courts would most likely consider the cost of the license 
when the infringement occurred, so it appears the Act 
120.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(v).
121.  Id § 2(c)(1).
122.  17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
would not change the allocation of damages at all.  The 
only question is whether the Shawn Bentley Orphan 
Works Act would have prevented a rights-holder from 
receiving the profits attributable to the infringement.  
When a reasonable license fee is lost, there is guarantee 
to receive profits,123 so it is unclear if rights-holders 
would have lost much in actual damages under the 
Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act. 
Statutory damages are another story.  An 
individual who previously registered their work with 
the Copyright Office, in doing what orphan works 
legislation was trying to incentivize,124 stands to lose up 
to $150,000 per work in potential damages.125  Absent 
this legislation and a lessening of liability, a court would 
likely find a potential licensor’s use of an orphan work 
to be willful infringement, bringing up to $150,000 in 
statutory damages.126  Obviously, judges in such cases 
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine 
the appropriate award of damages, but losing a 
potential $150,000 because of orphan works legislation 
is a significant change from current copyright law.  This 
is especially important because statutory damages are 
considered a reward for registering your work.127  
Injunctive relief could be rendered non-existent for 
orphan works under this legislation as well.  Section 
502 under current copyright law gives federal courts the 
authority to grant reasonable injunctions to prevent or 
restrain the infringement of copyrights.128  This can be 
more important to the copyright owner than monetary 
relief, as injunctive relief is the way for a rights-holder 
to protect the integrity of their work.  However, under 
the orphan works legislation, that option is once again 
taken away from the copyright owners by the courts 
asserting the payment of reasonable compensation.129  
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act arguably 
would have affected or eliminated Section 201(e) of 
123.  See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc. 246 F.3d 152, 167 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“[D]ecisions of this and other courts support the view 
that the owner’s actual damages may include in appropriate cases 
the reasonable license fee on which a willing buyer and a willing 
seller would have agreed for the use taken by the infringer.”).
124.  See 17 U.S.C. § 412
125.  Id. § 504(c)(2); see 17 U.S.C. § 412.
126.  Id.; see Island Software & Computer Serv. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that willful 
infringement requires the defendant being aware that they were 
infringing another’s copyright).
127.  See Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (holding that 
because the plaintiff waited almost two years from the date of first 
publication to register its copyright, they should not receive the 
reward of statutory damages).
128.  17 U.S.C. § 502.
129.  S. 2913 § 2(c)(2)(B) (“[A]ny injunctive relief ordered by 
the court may not restrain the infringer’s continued preparation or 
use of that new work, if the infringer pays reasonable compensation 
in a reasonably timely manner.”).
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Title 17 as well.  Section 201(e) does not allow any 
government body, official or organization to “seize, 
expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership 
with respect to the copyright, or any exclusive rights 
under copyright.”130  Under the orphan works 
legislation, the government, by granting “licenses” to 
potential users, would have exercised the right of the 
copyright holder to grant licenses to all of the exclusive 
rights under Section 106.131  Despite the fact that 
the government ownership of copyrights is rare,132 
the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act would have 
effectively allowed the government to act as if they 
owned all the orphan works.
A changing of Section 201(e) leads directly to a 
potential changing of the way we view Section 106.  If 
the government can give any of the Section 106 rights 
to a potential licensor without the owner’s consent, 
does the owner really have exclusive rights?  It is also 
unclear what rights a potential licensor would have 
been allowed to take as well.  The right to create a 
derivative work is clearly at the heart of the orphan 
works matter, but could it extend to the granting of 
a license to simply reproduce the work in the same 
manner as it was originally produced?  It is unclear 
how the courts would handle such a scenario, and 
until orphan works legislation is passed, it will remain 
unclear.  
One of the rights not represented in Section 106, 
but that is no less vehemently fought for amongst 
copyright owners, is the “right to exclude.”  The 
right to exclude anyone from licensing has long been 
viewed as one of the rights of a copyright owner.133  
This legislation would perhaps change the way that 
we approach copyright, changing copyright from a 
property right into something entirely different.    
Finally, the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act 
of 2008 arguably stood in the way of the Berne 
Convention and what it was trying to accomplish, 
along with many other international copyright treaties.  
Despite establishing that “the enjoyment and exercise” 
of all rights associated with copyright protection cannot 
130.  17 U.S.C. § 201(e).
131.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (transferring the exclusive rights to 
reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to 
distribute copies of the work, to perform the work publicly, to 
displace the work publicly).
132.  See 17 U.S.C § 105 (denying copyright protection 
for any work of the United States Government); see Schnapper v. 
Foley 667, F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (allowing the government to 
acquire ownership of copyrights).  
133.  Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)
(noting that Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 8 of the United States 
Constitution granted the right of an author to license their work, 
which in turn allows for the owner of a copyright to refuse to 
license their work).
be subject to the completion of some formality, the 
United States Congress has always been comfortable 
treading a fine line between what is a formality and 
what is not.134  The United States does not require an 
individual to register their work to receive copyright 
protection, a belief that follows the Berne Convention’s 
dicta; however, the United States does require 
registration if one wants to bring an infringement 
action or receive monetary relief for infringement in the 
form of statutory damages or attorney’s fees.135  While 
the United States has always claimed our registration 
system is valid in the face of international treaties, 
requiring registration to enforce your copyright has 
been deemed by some to have the same effect as forcing 
registration for protection in the first place.136  The 
Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 could have 
further complicated this scenario by necessitating the 
registration of your work with not only the Copyright 
Office, but also with other private databases and 
directories.137  Not doing so would lead to the potential 
loss of your exclusive rights to copyright.138  While 
still most likely falling in line with the United States’ 
rationale that current registries can still function in 
the wake of Berne and other international agreements, 
this scenario does add more ammunition to the 
argument that coerced registration could function as 
a true formality.  The ramifications of orphan works 
legislation have been noted and there is no doubt that 
they played a part in this legislation’s demise.  The next 
question is how bodies other than Congress would treat 
solutions to the orphan works problem.
VII. Reactions
The ideologies on the two opposite sides of the 
orphan works legislation have been battling for a few 
years now.  It could be argued that the rights-holders 
are “winning” the battle, as legislation has not passed 
both houses of Congress, but that also means that 
the orphan works problem has been allowed to grow 
exponentially for additional years without a legislative 
solution.  There was, however, a recent attempt at a 
private solution.  
134.  See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1438-39 (holding 
that copyright registration is not a formality when it only affects 
copyright remedies and not copyright subsistence).
135.  17 U.S.C. § 411-12.
136.  See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 1439 (noting that 
copyright owners who did not register their work previous to 
infringement are often left to extralegal means to reverse the 
infringement, thus eliminating the legal effect of having copyright 
protection).
137.  S. 2913 § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring potential licensors to 
search various databases and directories as required under reasonable 
circumstances).
138.  See S. 2913 § 2(b)(3).
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In 2004, the Google Corporation undertook 
a project to digitally copy books and other written 
works, with the eventual purpose that Google users 
could search through a book’s text online, amongst 
other goals.139  The project was met with a great deal 
of resistance from publishers and rights-holders.140  
Eventually an agreement was reached between the 
Author’s Guild and Google allowing Google to 
continue the digitizing books, sell subscriptions to 
an electronic books database, sell access to individual 
books, and to make other prescribed uses.141  The 
settlement would have created a registry of all the 
rights-holders of the works scanned in the Google 
Books Project.142  Should the owner of the work choose 
not to have their previously digitally scanned work 
used by Google or not to have their work digitized in 
the first place, they could have their book and/or their 
records removed from the registry.143  Although this 
system seemed like a reasonable agreement amongst 
consenting parties, there was a great deal of contention 
regarding orphan works.144  While Google was required 
to use all reasonable efforts to find the owners of 
the works,145 Google would, under the terms of the 
agreement, gain the rights to use the orphan works 
unless the rights-holder purposefully opted out of the 
registry.146  
While the Google Books agreement is not 
completely analogous to the Shawn Bentley Orphan 
Works Act, the similarities between the two scenarios 
are worthy to note.  These similarities were not lost 
on the federal court judge in charge of approving or 
denying the settlement, Judge Chin, either, who said 
it has been the charge of Congress to further copyright 
policy.147  While the issue was in front of him however, 
he held that the Google Books settlement was not “fair, 
adequate, or reasonable.”148  Judge Chin held that it 
is inconsistent with the longstanding purpose of U.S. 
copyright law to force rights-holders to come forward 
to protect their rights when Google first copied the 
139.  The Authors Guild,  05 Civ. 8136, slip op. at 2-3. 
140.  Id. at 4.
141.  Id.
142.  Id. at 7-8.
143.  Id. at 8.
144.  Id. at 23-24 (holding that Congress has attempted to 
solve the orphan works problem, signifying it may not be the role or 
right of a private agreement to do so).
145.  Id. at 9.
146.  Id. at 32-34.
147.  Id. at 23 (“The question of who should be entrusted 
with guardianship of orphan books . . . safeguards are matters more 
appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement 
among private, self-interested parties.”).
148.  Id. at 1.
works without seeking permission.149  In addition, the 
judge found it to be very unlikely that most copyright 
owners would actually know to come forward to 
enforce their copyrights by removing their works from 
the registry.150  The court also held that the agreement 
would have a massive impact on foreign rights-holders, 
who would most likely find it more difficult to receive 
notification of what they must do to protect their work 
than it would be for U.S. rights-holders.151  Judge Chin 
finally took note that foreign digital libraries, which 
are in line with international treaty agreements, would 
not receive control over orphan works that Google was 
trying to obtain with the agreement.152  
While the first private attempt at a solution to 
the orphan works problem failed in federal court, this 
does not mean that a legislative attempt at a similar 
solution would not be successful.  All the ruling does 
is reinforce the basic concept that current copyright 
law will in no way provide for a solution to the orphan 
works problem.  Congress’s changes to copyright law 
enabled the orphan works situation, and it is only when 
U.S. copyright law changes again that the problem 
will disappear; the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works 
Act was an attempt at that change.  The question is, 
is the United States Congress ready to sacrifice many 
of the current elements of copyright law to reach that 
solution?  The Senate was in 2008.  Moreover, while 
that attempt was meant to shape the actions to be taken 
by all copyright holders, that may not have been a bad 
thing.  In fact, it may have been the right solution for 
U.S. copyright law.  
VIII. The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act 
Would Have Been Good for the United 
States Copyright Market, and Thus Good 
for the United States
The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 
was no doubt a controversial piece of legislation.  This 
controversy does not necessitate that the legislation be 
unsuccessful, does not attempt to incorrectly legislate, 
nor does it place the legislation outside of the “goals” 
of copyright law.  In fact, the Shawn Bentley Orphan 
Works Act might have been the most successful attempt 
to get the United States back to what copyrights 
originally were meant to be and do in the United 
149.  Id. at 35.
150.  Id. at 35-36.
151.  Id. at 43-44 (noting the concerns of foreign rights-
holders that they are unable to accurately search the records of the 
Copyright Office without traveling to Washington, D.C. or paying 
a fee of $330).
152.  Id. at 45 (noting that the German digital library 
“Deutshe Digitale Bibliothek” must still license the rights of orphan 
works in order to use them).
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The solution to the orphan works problem is to 
make every rights-holder locatable when an individual 
wishes to license the work.  It seems clear that the 
legislation, with its imposition of informal formalities, 
would have done that.  Individuals could license 
orphan works under certain reasonable search criteria, 
and that would in turn encourage current and future 
rights-holders to make themselves known to potential 
licensors.  That is not what makes the legislation 
controversial though; what makes this legislation truly 
novel and insightful are the requirements that rights-
holders must satisfy to maintain their rights.  Why 
should this be such a controversy though?  The greater 
controversy might, in fact, be the changes to U.S. 
copyright law that led us to the problems in the first 
place.  
The first copyright law in the United States was 
a law populated with formalities to receive copyright 
protection.  The Copyright Act of 1790 gave copyright 
protection (the sole right and liberty of printing, 
reprinting, publishing and vending) for 14 years to 
any individual who registered their work with the U.S. 
government.154  To extend protection another 14 years, 
the rights-holder would have to renew their work with 
the government again.155  The protection would never 
be granted unless individuals deposited a copy of their 
work with the government as well.156  From the birth of 
this nation, copyright holders were expected to perform 
certain actions to receive copyright protection.  
The belief that formalities were beneficial and 
necessary for copyright protection was held firm in 
U.S. law until the implementation of the Copyright 
Act of 1976 and the Berne Convention, which 
eliminated copyright formalities from U.S. copyright 
law.  Even as the United States moved away from 
copyright formalities, it does not appear that was ever 
the true intent of the Copyright Office.  The Register 
of Copyrights did not approve the instant granting of 
copyright protection when Congress looked to revise 
copyright law in the 1970s.157  The Register believed 
153.  See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (noting that the 
copyright clause is not meant to benefit individual people, but “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” for the people).
154.  Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (protecting only 
maps, charts, or books).
155.  Id.
156.  Id. at 125.  
157.  Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 333 (citing the Report of the 
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright 
Law (1961), available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Report_
of_the_Register_of_Copyrights_on_the_General_Revision_of_
the_U.S._Copyright_Law (“The Constitution does not establish 
copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to grant 
such rights if it thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit of the 
that when the public’s interests and the interests of the 
artist were to conflict, the interests of the public were of 
greater priority.158  
Such favoritism of copyright formalities in our 
legislative past shows that the United States was 
never a nation that treated a copyright as a natural 
right.159  One could assume that if a copyright were 
a natural right, created upon inception of a work, 
an individual would have to do nothing other than 
create the work to receive protection.160  Instead, the 
U.S. Government traditionally viewed copyrights 
as a government-granted monopoly over the rights 
associated with a work.161  It was the “thinkers” and 
authors of treatises who instead believed in the “natural 
rights of authorship,” viewing formalities as hurdles in 
the path of that right.162  Therefore, while the “thinkers” 
and most Western European countries believed that 
copyrights were natural rights,163 the United States 
continued to legislate and adjudicate that copyrights 
were government-granted monopolies, subject to the 
strictest formalities.164     
By acknowledging the United States’ rationale 
on copyright’s origins and what was required to 
receive them, one can foresee the potential problems 
that the United States would have by eliminating 
copyright formalities to fall in line with international 
conventions.  The U.S. copyright system was based 
on the principle that someone must do more than 
simply create the work to own a copyright in it.  So 
when Congress decided to retreat from that principle, 
problems arose, the most significant being orphan 
works.  Recognizing this problem, Congress attempted 
to re-impose the formalities through the creation of 
informal formalities in the Shawn Bentley Orphan 
Works Act.  Forced to function in between U.S. 
copyright principles and international beliefs, orphan 
author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are 
given.”).
158.  See id.
159.  See id. at 319
160.  See id. at 318-19 (noting that the imposition of 
formalities reflects the concept that creating a work alone does not 
justify protection).
161.  See id. (holding that a government-granted monopoly 
would most likely require the copyright holder to meet certain 
requirements to receive the copyright).  
162.  See id. at 320.
163.  See also Circular 38A: International Copyright Relations of 
the United States, 1 (Nov. 2010) (noting that France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Italy,  Portugal, and Spain agreed to the Berne 
Convention, and subsequent elimination of copyright formalities, 
in the 19th century).
164.  See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 320-21 (recognizing 
that federal legislation and subsequent federal court decisions that 
enforced the “highly restricted view of copyright” that prevailed 
throughout the 19th century in the United States).
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works legislation danced the fine line between freely 
granting copyrights and asking owners to do more 
than simply create.  Orphan works legislation simply 
acknowledged that the United States has always treated 
copyrights differently than most of the world, and that 
formalities, albeit informal, will be necessary.
IX. The Next Step for Orphan Works Legislation
So where can we go from here?  All attempts at 
legislation have failed.  It does not appear that another 
attempt at solving the orphan works problem will 
be made in the current political climate.  If another 
attempt were made though, some changes could make 
the solution more amiable for all.  
A simplification of the proposed legislation could 
go far to increase the likelihood that orphan works 
legislation would be passed.  Referring back to the 
proposed statutory language from the Copyright 
Office’s Report on Orphan Works, the legislation 
would call for a “reasonably diligent search to locate the 
infringed copyright” when “performed in good faith.”165 
There were no criteria for specialized databases to be 
searched or for tools to be used, not even a mandatory 
search of the Copyright Office Registry.166  Instead, the 
legislation required only a diligent search.167  This could 
lessen the formalistic requirements placed on every 
rights-holder while still encouraging preemptive actions 
to make themselves known to potential licensors.  The 
searches would still be required, and a possible loss of 
exclusive rights might occur, but no longer would the 
rights-holders be told where their works should go.  By 
giving creators more control over their own works and 
how they are to make themselves known to the world, 
rights-holders are given more freedom to protect their 
works as they see fit.  All that would be required to 
accomplish this is a simplification of the legislation’s 
language.
By not statutorily defining the criteria for a 
diligent search, Congress would not be limiting itself 
to specific ways that potential licensors could find 
the owners of works.  The Report on Orphan Works 
spoke of the rise of new tools to identify and protect 
works168; however, the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works 
Act attempted to require the use of these tools before 
it was known what tools would prove useful in the first 
place169.  The Report on Orphan Works frequently 
165.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 127.
166.  Id.
167.  Id.
168.  Id. at 104 (noting that the growth in technology, 
particularly internet based technology, would factor into what 
qualified as a reasonable search as it would be much easier to 
identify and locate authors).    
169.  See S. 2913 § 514(b)(2)(A)(ii)(requiring specific steps to 
be taken to qualify as a diligent search).
emphasized the need for flexibility in defining what 
constitutes a reasonable search.170  By eliminating the 
factors of a diligent search (records of the Copyright 
office, technological tools, appropriate databases, etc.), 
Congress would encourage the development of new 
resources to find rights-holders instead of forcing those 
resources to fall into specific categories.  
The elimination of the diligent search criteria could 
also encourage the development of a more reasonable 
diligent search.  The Report on Orphan Works 
acknowledged the prevalence of “private users” who 
wished to obtain a license to use an orphan work.171  
These private users would be the least likely to use the 
orphan work for commercial benefit and it could be 
assumed that they also had limited funds to conduct a 
diligent search.  Such uses would harm rights-holders 
the least, and yet orphan works legislation still required 
every potential user to complete every step of the 
diligent search.  Despite the limited impact of private 
users on the licensing market, the licensors would still 
be required to conduct ineffective searches of copyright 
records, occasionally paying Copyright Office staff to 
conduct such a search in addition to potentially paying 
for expert assistance or the right to use technological 
databases.172  Such monetary requirements would 
still deter private users from appropriating orphan 
works, and the deterrence of the least harmful uses 
of orphan works is antithetical to the purpose of the 
legislation.173  The elimination of diligent search criteria 
would no doubt facilitate the use of orphan works by 
private users, a goal that is supposedly the focus of this 
legislation.174  
Finally, instead of mandating specific search 
criteria for a potential licensor175, future legislation 
should address the factors that courts would use to 
170.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 104.
171.  Id. at 125. (noting the prevalence of individuals wishing 
to reproduce old family photographs).  
172.  S. 2913 § 514(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring searches of the 
records of the Copyright Office, technological databases, and the 
use of expert assistance to conduct a reasonable search). 
173.  See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 38-40 (noting 
that small-time users would might be willing to pay small fees to 
use a work, but only if it would ensure finding the owner of the 
copyright).
174.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 8 (asserting that 
the first goal of orphan works legislation was to create a system that 
would make it more likely for users to find a relevant rights-holder 
and negotiated a license agreement and recognizing that the second 
goal was to encourage use of orphan works only when the rights-
holder could not be found).
175.  See id. (requiring that every diligent search entail a search 
of the records of the Copyright Office, as search of available sources 
of copyright authorship, the use of appropriate technological 




determine if a reasonable search actually occurred.  The 
Report on Orphan Works acknowledged that what is a 
reasonable search in certain circumstances might not be 
a reasonable search in others.176  The reasonability of a 
search would often depend on numerous factors, which 
would have to be balanced by the courts.177  Arguably, 
the most important factor to determine reasonability is 
the nature and extent of the use.178  The Report stressed 
that the more commercial the use of an orphan work 
by the potential licensor, the greater the effort the 
licensor must expend in finding the rights-holder.179  
This factor will truly protect the rights-holder, as the 
potential licensor’s search for rights-holders, while 
intending to profit, would be scrutinized for good faith 
and diligence.  Orphan works legislation must focus 
upon this factor in order to persuade rights-holders that 
they will be sufficiently protected from licensors who 
stand to benefit from attempting to skirt the reasonable 
search requirements, or those licensors who perform 
the bare minimum when conducting the search.  
Instead of establishing strict diligent search criteria for 
the licensor, orphan works legislation should establish 
statutory factors that courts will use to determine the 
reasonability of the search, with the nature and extent 
of the use being the most influential.  Such a statutory 
construction has proven to be effective in the past, with 
federal courts embracing and shaping the four factors 
of copyright fair use.180  By giving the courts factors 
that would shape what constitutes a reasonable search 
instead of strictly defining it, the legislation could be 
friendlier to both parties involved.  The private users 
who wish to license orphan works would, in theory, 
not be forced to waste money on costly and ineffective 
searches.  The rights-holders should, in turn, be able 
to make themselves known as much or as little as 
they would choose.  They could choose to identify 
themselves everywhere, likely increasing that odds that 
every licensor would find them, or they could choose 
to put themselves in only a few small places, hopefully 
allowing those who truly wished to profit off their work 
would find them, letting the private users with limited 
means use the orphan work freely.  This flexibility is 
essential for orphan works legislation to succeed.      
By simplifying orphan works legislation and 
replacing the diligent search criteria with the factors 
176.  U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 3, at 98.
177.  Id. at 98-108 (holding that the reasonability of a search 
would be shaped by identifying information on the work itself, the 
public nature of the work, age of the work, whether indentifying 
information exists in publically available records, and the status of 
the author).
178.  See id. at 107-08.
179.  See id.
180.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
of a reasonably diligent search, a more flexible, and 
therefore workable, standard will be created.  Such a 
standard will assuage the fears of rights-holders and 
make orphan works legislation easier to pass, all the 
while accomplishing the goals of previous orphan works 
legislation.
X. Conclusion
There seems to be unanimous agreement that 
orphan works are a devastating problem for copyright 
law; however, there is no agreement as to what should 
be done about them.  The most recent legislative 
attempt at fixing that problem, the Shawn Bentley 
Orphan Works Act of 2008, was novel, but by creating 
informal formalities, the bill might have been doomed 
from the start.  When you look at the beginnings of 
copyright protection in the United States though, 
the idea behind informal formalities seems to fall 
in line with the country’s goals.  The United States, 
through legislation and common law, has always 
treated a copyright as something that is earned, not 
freely given.  It is with this goal in mind that Congress 
must continue to shape its orphan works legislation, 
perhaps by eliminating search criteria and instead 
creating factors for courts to use in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable search.  By taking these actions, 
Congress may be able to eliminate orphan works and 
establish the copyright license market as a functional 
part or our national economy.  
